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 (Opinion filed : September 16, 2013) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Maryann Cottrell and Richard Holland each appeal from an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted summary judgment for 
the Defendant in their lawsuit that raised claims of retaliation under the Americans with 
Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq. (“NJLAD”).  We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
 We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same test that the district court is to use.  Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. 
Dist. of Phila., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009).  We will affirm a district court’s 
judgment if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Dilworth v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 418 
F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2005).  To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the 
ADA, Cottrell and Holland were required to show:  (1) they engaged in a statutorily 
protected expression; (2) they suffered an adverse action; and (3) the adverse reaction 
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was causally related to the protected expression.  Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 
1219 (11th Cir. 2004); Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir. 
2002).  We agree with the District Court that Cottrell and Holland failed to establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation. 
 Cottrell and Holland claimed in their amended complaint that defendant Zagami, 
LLC, which owns three related businesses (“Landmark”), had retaliated against them for 
activity protected by the ADA, specifically, they alleged that in retaliation for their 
complaints about unauthorized use of handicap-accessible parking spots at Landmark, 
Landmark issued letters banning them from entering Landmark’s property.1  Cottrell 
engaged in protected activity when she filed citizen’s complaints against patrons of 
Landmark for handicapped parking violations in October and November of 2005, and 
when she filed another such complaint against Landmark and a beer distributor on 
January 27, 2006.2  We agree that being banned from Landmark properties suffices, at 
least at the stage of the prima facie case, to establish an adverse action.  But Cottrell and 
Holland did not establish a prima facie case of causation.  The letter banning Cottrell 
from Landmark, citing her “prior actions . . . disruptive of the regular and essential 
operations” of the business, is dated July 6, 2006, over five months after any parking 
                                                 
1 The complaint also raised claims under state law, but because the same showings are required 
to establish a retaliation claim under both the NJLAD and the ADA, see Tartaglia v. UBS 
PaineWebber, Inc., 961 A.2d 1167, 1192 (N.J. 2008), our discussion applies equally to both of 
these claims  
 
2 We agree with the District Court that Holland failed to establish that he engaged in any 
protected activity before the time of the claimed adverse action, as he could not identify any 
specific incident when he documented parking violations at Landmark prior to the ban. 
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violations were issued.3  This period of time is not suggestive of a retaliatory motive 
based on the protected activity.  LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 
217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (gap of three months between protected activity and adverse 
action, without more, cannot create inference of causation to defeat summary judgment).  
We agree with the District Court that the ban letter’s timing “suggests that it was causally 
connected to Cottrell’s opposition to [Landmark’s] liquor license renewal.”  Dist. Ct. Op. 
at 12.  The letter was issued ten days after a public meeting, held at Cottrell’s request, at 
which she opposed renewal of Landmark’s liquor license, for reasons having nothing to 
do with Landmark’s alleged ADA violations.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4
                                                 
3 Cottrell documented some alleged parking violations on June 26 and 27, 2006, but the 
complaints were not signed or issued until two weeks after the ban letter was sent, and Cottrell 
does not claim that Landmark was aware of this protected activity before the complaints were 
issued. 
 
4 Appellants’ motion to file a CD containing exhibits is granted and the appellee’s motion to 
strike the appellants’ brief is denied. 
